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THE EXPORT ADMINISTRATION ACT
AMENDMENTS OF 1983: FOREIGN
AVAILABILITY OF CONTROLLED
GOODS AND TECHNOLOGY
On September 30, 1983, the Export Administration Act of 1979
(EAA)' expired, renewing congressional debate over the use of export
controls to protect national security and further foreign policy goals.2
One of the most significant controversies involves the EAA's inade-
quate consideration of the availability of foreign substitutes for con-
trolled items. Congressional reports show that export administrators
have failed to implement the foreign availability provisions of the 1979
Act.3 Critics argue that when the United States restricts the export of
goods and technologies which are freely available from foreign sources,
it punishes American exporters without achieving export policy objec-
tives.4 Proponents of export restrictions respond that regardless of the
availability of foreign substitutes, the United States should neither arm
its adversaries nor trade with nations whose policies or behavior it
abhors.5
A series of bills to amend and reauthorize the 1979 EAA were intro-
duced in both Houses of Congress in January and February of 1983.6
President Reagan transmitted his own proposed changes to the House
of Representatives on April 7, 1983.' Following extensive committee
hearings, each House produced its own proposed Export Administra-
tion Amendments Act of 1983. The Senate bill, S. 979, reflected the
Reagan Administration's desire to strengthen and expand export con-
trols to tighten national security.' The House bill, H.R. 3231, was de-
1. 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2420 (Supp. III 1979). The present Act was repeatedly extended on a
month to month basis. See, e.g., 130 CONG. REC. S1917 (daily ed. Feb. 29, 1984).
2. The EAA also authorizes the President to restrict the export of scarce materials. 50 U.S.C.
app. § 2402(2)(c) (Supp. III 1979).
3. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, TECHNOLOGY AND EAST-WEST TRADE: AN UPDATE
20 (May 1983). [hereinafter cited as UPDATE].
4. Oversight on the Commerce Department's Fulfillment of Its Responsibilities Under the Export
Administration Act. Hearing Before the Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1983) (statement of Sen. John Heinz, R-Pa.) [hereinafter cited as Over-
sight on the Commerce Department].
5. 129 CONG. REC. H7794 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1983) (statement of Rep. Duncan Hunter, R-
Cal.).
6. HOUSE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, EXPORT ADMINISTRATION AMENDMENTS ACT OF
1983, H.R. REP. No. 257, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1983); SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HouS-
ING AND URBAN AFFAIRS, THE EXPORT ADMINISTRATION ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1983, S.
REP. No. 170, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1983).
7. EXPORT ADMINISTRATION AUTHORIZATION, COMMUNICATION FROM THE PRESIDENT OF
THE UNITED STATES TRANSMITTING A DRAFT OF PROPOSED LEGISLATION TO AMEND AND
REAUTHORIZE THE EXPORT ADMINISTRATION ACT OF 1979, H.R. Doc. No. 40, 98th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1983) [hereinafter cited as EXPORT ADMINISTRATION AUTHORIZATION].
8. S. REP. No. 170, supra note 6, at 1.
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cidedly pro-trade, favoring fewer controls and more congressional
oversight of the export control system. 9 Both bills include provisions to
improve the foreign availability assessment capacity of the Office of
Export Administration (OEA). The bills intended to more efficiently
integrate foreign availability considerations in the export control sys-
tem. The final Export Administration Amendments Act of 1983 will be
the product of compromise by joint conference.' 0 This analysis of the
two bills will examine whether foreign availability of controlled goods
and technologies ought to affect America's export control policy."
This note briefly describes technology transfers to non-friendly na-
tions, outlines the system of export controls under the EAA, and de-
scribes the provisions of the EAA which consider foreign availability.
It then examines the sections of S. 979 and H.R. 3231 which amend the
EAA's foreign availability provisions and analyzes the curative value
of these proposed amendments. Finally, the note suggests the appro-
priate uses and limitations of foreign availability considerations in the
export control system.
CONSIDERATIONS OF FOREIGN AVAILABILITY IN PRESENT
EXPORT CONTROL MECHANISMS
The Dangers of Technology Transfers
In an unclassified report published in April, 1982, the Central In-
telligence Agency (CIA) reported that the Soviet Union is involved in a
"massive, well-planned, well-managed, national" campaign to obtain
U.S. technology.' 2 As a result of technology acquisitions, the Soviet
Union has saved billions of dollars and years of research needed to
accelerate its industrial growth and military capabilities.' 3 Defense
9. H.R. REP. No. 257, supra note 6, at 7.
10. 130 CONG. REC. S2537 (daily ed. Mar. 12, 1984); the joint committee met on April 12, 1984,
but did not complete action on the bill and recessed subject to call. 130 CONG. REC. D513
(daily ed. Apr. 12, 1984).
11. The House passed H.R. 3231 on October 27, 1983, 129 CONG. REC. H8766 (daily ed. Oct. 27,
1983); the Senate passed S. 979 on Mar. 1, 1984, 130 CONG. REC. S2143 (daily ed. Mar. 1,
1984). On March 12, 1984, having been unable to agree to House amendments to S. 979, the
Senate accepted the House's request for a joint conference on the Export Administration
Amendments, 130 CONG. REC. S2537 (daily ed. Mar. 12, 1984).
12. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, SOVIET ACQUISITION OF AMERICAN TECHNOLOGY 1
(1982) [hereinafter cited as SOVIET ACQUISITION]. The CIA defines technology as "the appli-
cation of scientific information, know-how, critical materials, keystone manufacturing and
test equipment, and end products which are essential to the research and development as
well as the series manufacture of modem high quality weapons and military equipment."
The Office of Technology Assessment (an independent Congressional advisory research of-
fice, directed by a bicameral board) defines technology as "the knowledge necessary to de-
sign, create, or implement a process." OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, TECHNOLOGY
AND EAST-WEST TRADE 99 (1979) [hereinafter cited as TECHNOLOGY AND EAST-WEST
TRADE]. Because "technology" includes both products and ideas, restricted technology is
necessarily listed according to broad categories, rather than specific items.
13. The Extent of Technology Transfersfrom the West to the Soviet Union During the Past Decade
and the Contributions Such Transfers Have Made to Strengthen the Soviet Military Industrial
Base." Hearing Before the Subcomm. on International Finance and Monetary Policy of the
Comm. on Banking Housing and Urban Affairs, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 57 (statement of Fred C.
1984]
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Department officials warn that the United States now risks "losing the
quality edge on which our structure of national defense and alliance
depends" 14 as a result of technology transfers.
The danger posed by these transfers is even more immediate than
that posed by the long-running "arms race." In September, 1983, a
Soviet SU-15 bomber shot down a Korean Airlines commercial flight
which strayed over a Soviet base on Sakhalin Island.15 All two hun-
dred and sixty-nine passengers died.' 6 The SU-15 normally carries one
radar homing, one infrared homing, and two infrared close-range mis-
siles. 7 The technology needed to build and fire such missiles was di-
rectly borrowed from American high-tech resources. Technical design
information for the American-made F-15 look-down/shoot-down ra-
dar system and the B-1 bomber radar system has been used to make
counterpart and countermeasure Soviet radar systems.' 8 The Depart-
ment of Defense believes that an American Sidewinder missile, stolen
from a Bavarian NATO base, was the prototype for strikingly similar
Soviet air-to-air infrared homing missile systems. 9 These transfers of
American technology enabled the Soviet Union to build the weapon
that killed thirty Americans.2" Transfers of Western technology have
also allowed the Soviet Union to copy America's SS-20 and Backfire
bomber;2' to develop inertial missile guidance systems ten times more
accurate than the Soviets could previously produce;22 and to mass pro-
duce heavy duty military trucks.23 Technology transfers which enable
the Soviet Union to improve and expand its military capabilities are a
present threat to the safety of American citizens.
The CIA estimates that about seventy percent of the militarily sig-
nificant Western technology acquired by the Soviet Union has been
obtained through illegal espionage.24 Legal purchases of technological
Ikle, Undersecretary for Policy, Department of Defense) [hereinafter cited as The Extent of
Technology Transfers].
14. Transfer of United States High Technology To The Soviet Union and Soviet Bloc Nations;
Hearing Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the Comm. on Government Af-
fairs, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 260 (statement of Dr. Stephen D. Bryen, Deputy Assistant Secre-
tary of Defense) [hereinafter cited as Transfer of United States High Technology].
15. 129 CONG. REC. H7462 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1983) (statement of Rep. Gerald Solomon, R-
N.Y.); Bums, Soviet Says Order to Down Jet Came at Local Level, N.Y. Times, Sept. 10,
1983, at 1, col. 4; McFadden, U.S. Says Soviet Downed Korean Airliner, N.Y. Times, Sept. 2,
1983, at 1, col. 6.
16. Id.
17. JANE'S ALL THE WORLD'S AIRCRAFT 1983-84, 230-31 (1983).
18. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE: SOVIET MILITARY POWER (1983), reprinted in 130 CONG. REC.
S1940, S1942 (daily ed. Feb. 29, 1984).
19. Id. at S1942; A SUTrrTON, NATIONAL SUICIDE: MILITARY AID TO THE SOVIET UNION 204
(1973).
20. Among the Americans killed, was Rep. Larry McDonald, D-Ga.; McFadden, supra note 15,
at A4, col. 1.
21. Guzzardi, Cutting Russia's Harvest of United States Technology, FORTUNE, May 30, 1983, at
102, 108.
22. SOVIET ACQUISITION, supra note 12, at 6-7.
23. Id. at 3.
24. Transfer of United States High Technology, supra note 14, at 236 (statement of Admiral
Bobby R. Inman, Deputy Director, Central Intelligence Agency).
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equipment have nevertheless been very important to the growth of the
Soviet industrial base.25 The Soviet Union devotes about fifteen per-
cent of its gross national product (GNP) to its war machine.26 Any
expansion of the Soviet industrial base is more likely to result in in-
creased military production rather than an increase in the production
of consumer goods.27 For example, in the late 1960's, the United States
and Western Europe sold one and one half million dollars worth of
truck manufacturing equipment to the Soviet Union.28 With the help
of substantial loans from the American Export-Import Bank, the Sovi-
ets built the Kama Truck plant, which is capable of producing 100,000
multi-axle heavy trucks per year.29 In 1981, trucks manufactured at the
Kama River plant were used to invade Afganistan. 30
The export of weapons and munitions is controlled by the Arms
Export Control Act of 1976.3  The EAA restricts the transfer of tech-
nology imbedded in consumer and "dual use" goods.3 2 "Dual use"
goods have both a civilian and a military use.33
The ability of the United States to prevent the transfer of technol-
ogy to the Soviet Union and its allies is limited by the availability of
foreign substitutes. Western Europe and Japan are not only capable of
producing technology equal to or better than American technology, but
are generally eager to sell technology to the Soviet Union and its al-
lies.34 Presently, the United States only enjoys a qualitative lead over
foreign producers of some types of computer software and
microprocessors. 35  Recent Japanese advances in the development of
supercomputers 36 have effectively ended the United States' monopoly
in high performance computers.37
The availability of these comparable, and sometimes superior, for-
eign substitutes for American technology poses three dangers which
United States export policy must address. First, the United States risks
losing foreign markets, further damaging an -already unsatisfactory
25. SOVIET ACQUISITION, supra, note 12, at 3.
26. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, supra note 17, at S1941. By comparison, the United States de-
votes about seven percent of its GNP to the military. Id.
27. Transfer of United States High Technology, supra note 14, at 346 (statement of Dr. Lara H.
Baker, Jr., assistant office leader, International Technology Office, Los Alamos National
Laboratory, University of California).
28. SOVIET ACQUISITION, supra note 12, at 3.
29. A. SuTrON, supra note 19, at 134 (1973).
30. SOVIET ACQuISITION, supra note 12, at 3.
31. 22 U.S.C. §§ 2751-2794 (1982).
32. Murphy and Downey, National Security, Foreign Policy and Individual Rights.- The Quandary
of United States Export Controls, 30 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 791,796 (1981).
33. For example, the same seimconductors and integrated circuits used in video games can be
used in missile guidance systems. Zonderman, Policing High Tech Exports, N.Y. Times,
Nov. 27, 1983, § 6 (Magazine) at 100, 125.
34. The Extent of Technology Transfers, supra note 13, at 109 (statement of Sen. John Heinz, R-
Pa.).
35. Id. at 13 (statement of Sen. William Armstrong, R-Colo.).
36. Supercomputers are high speed, easily programmed computers which are used both by busi-
ness and the military.
37. Big Japanese Gain in Computers Seen, N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 1984, § 1, at I, col. 1, at 8, col. 1.
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trade deficit.3" Second, the United States risks becoming dependent on
foreign manufacturers for technology which is critical to its national
security.39 Third, it has become virtually impossible to deprive adver-
saries of high technology goods.4" It is essential to harmonize Ameri-
can export policies with the realities of foreign technological advances.
The Structure of Export Controls
Under American law, freedom to export is a privilege, not a right.'
Since 1949,42 Congress has delegated to the President broad discretion-
ary powers to limit or deny export privileges for national security and
foreign policy reasons. 3 Under the EAA, the Commerce Department,
through its Office of Export Administration (OEA), grants export privi-
leges by issuing three types of export licenses: a general license, a qual-
ified general license, and a validated license." An exporter determines
what type of license it needs by consulting the Commodity Control List
(CCL), published in the Code of Federal Regulations.45 The regula-
tions divide all exportable commodities into technical categories46 and
all foreign countries into seven country groups. 7 The present CCL
contains 200 categories, including 100,000 items.48 The CCL identifies
which type of license is required to export goods from each technical
category to each country group.49 The country group and CCL catego-
ries combine to form restrictions on "all goods shipped to certain coun-
tries, or for certain types of goods shipped to certain countries, or for
certain types of goods shipped to any country. 50
No license is required to export goods or technologies to United
States territories and possessions or for most exports to Canada, but
exports to all other countries require some type of license.5' A general
38. The merchandise trade balance has been in deficit since 1976. ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE
PRESIDENT, FEBRUARY, 1984, at 185. In 1983 the merchandise trade deficit was $65 billion; a
deficit of $110 billion has been forecast for 1984. Id. at 42-43.
39. Big Japanese Gain in Computers Seen, supra note 37, at 8.
40. Abbott, Linking Trade to Political Goals.- Foreign Policy Export Controls in the 1970's and
1980's, 65 MINN. L. REV. 739, 804 (1981).
41. Evrard, The Export Administration Act of 1979. Analysis ofits Major Provisions and Potential
Impacts on Un.ited States Exporters, 12 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 1, 17 (1982).
42. Export Control Act of 1949, 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2021-2032 (Supp. V 1970). The Act expired
on December 31, 1969. Id. § 2032.
43. Berman & Garson, United States Export Controls-Past, Present, and Future, 67 COLUM. L.
REV. 791, 792 (1967).
44. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2403(a) (Supp. III 1979).
45. Id. § 2403(b). The Commodity Control List appears at 15 C.F.R. § 399.1, Supp. 1 (1983).
46. 15 C.F.R. § 370, Supp. 2 (1983).
47. 15 C.F.R. § 370, Supp. 1 (1983).
48. HOUSE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, EXPORT ADMINISTRATION AMENDMENTS ACT OF
1983, H.R. Doc. No. 257, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1983) [hereinafter cited as H.R. Doc. No.
2571.
49. 15 C.F.R. § 399.1 (1983); INDUSTRY AND TRADE ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
COMMERCE, EXPORT ADMINISTRATION REPORT: SEMIANNUAL: APRIL 1978-SEPTEMBER
1979, at 2 (1979) [hereinafter cited as EXPORT ADMINISTRATION REPORT: 1979].
50. Berman & Garson, supra note 43, at 814.
51. 15 C.F.R. §§ 370.3-70.4 (1983).
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license confers broad authority to export. 2 The OEA designates cer-
tain civilian, non-risk goods which may be exported by general li-
cense. 53 An exporter of an item designated for general licensing need
not formally apply to the OEA, but simply files a descriptive export
declaration with the customs office. 54 Between ninety and ninety-five
percent of all goods exported from the United States qualify for a gen-
eral license.55
The remaining five to ten percent of American exports are subject
to a more rigorous review by the OEA.56 The OEA restricts exports of
these goods by requiring either a "qualified general license" which au-
thorizes a series of transactions, or a "validated license" which autho-
rizes a single transaction.57 In some cases, these licenses require
authorization by the OEA before the goods can be re-exported by the
foreign purchaser to a third country.58 Exporters of goods which re-
quire a qualified general license or a validated license must apply to the
OEA for permission to export that particular item to a specific destina-
tion. Approximately 80,000 such applications are made to the OEA
annually. 59
National Security Controls
Under present law, the OEA restricts exports of goods and technol-
ogy "which would make a significant contribution to the military po-
tential of any other country or combination of countries which would
prove detrimental to the national security of the United States."6 The
Commerce Department, with the advice of interested governmentS61
agencies, lists goods with potential national security risks on the
CCL.6 1 The annually updated list63 includes both civilian and dual-use
goods and technologies.64 The Secretary of Defense reviews and re-
52. 15 C.F.R. § 370.2 (1983).
53. For example, a traveler's baggage, if it contains only " household" and "personal" effects,
"vehicles," "tools of trade" and a limited number of "shotguns and shotgun shells" qualifies
for a general license. 15 C.F.R. § 371.6 (1983).
54. 15 C.F.R. §§ 371.1-1.2 (1983).
55. TECHNOLOGY AND EAST-WEST TRADE, supra note 12, at 127 (1979).
56. Id.
57. 15 C.F.R. § 372.2(a)-.2(b) (1983).
58. INTERNATIONAL TRADE ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, EXPORT AD-
MINISTRATION REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 1982, at 1 (1982) [hereinafter cited as EXPORT AD-
MINISTRATION REPORT: 1982].
59. H.R. Doc. No. 257, supra note 48, at 3.
60. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2402(2)(A) (Supp. III 1979).
61. The EAA instructs the Secretary of Commerce to seek the advice of "appropriate depart-
ments and agencies." 50 U.S.C. app. § 2404(c)(2) (Supp. III 1979). In the past these have
included the Departments of State, Energy, Defense and Treasury, and the Central Intelfi-
gence Agency, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and the National Bu-
reau of Standards. TECHNOLOGY AND EAST-WEST TRADE, supra note 12, at 131.
62. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2404(c) (Supp. III 1979).
63. Id. § 2404(c)(3).
64. Articles solely of military use are controlled by the International Traffic in Arms Regula-
tions, 15 C.F.R. §§ 121.01-130.23 (1983), under the authority of the Arms Export Control Act
of 1976. 22 U.S.C. §§ 2751-2794 (1982).
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vises the Commerce Department's CCL, and the President resolves
conflicts between the Commerce and Defense Departments regarding
the CCL and has ultimate authority over its content.65
In a 1979 Amendment, the EAA directs the Secretary of Defense to
compile and maintain a list of "Military Critical Technologies"
(MCTL).66 Unlike the CCL, which lists specific types of technological
goods, the MCTL lists specific types of technological knowledge,
processes, and techniques which have military applications. 67 The
MCTL was intended to eventually replace the CCL and thereby sim-
plify export restrictions. 68 Drafters of the 1979 amendment envisioned
a very short MCTL, containing only "the subset of technologies of sig-
nificant military value on which our national military technology supe-
riority can be presumed to be most dependent. ' 69 Nevertheless, the
over-cautious Defense Department has compiled an 800 page MCTL
which it has kept classified.7° Thus, the Defense and Commerce De-
partments review applications for export using separate restrictive lists.
The Defense and Commerce Departments review applications to
export items listed for control with closer scrutiny if the purchasing
country is communist or Soviet-aligned. 71 The OEA has authority to
approve most applications for export to "Free World" countries with-
out referral to other government agencies.72 Sixty thousand of the
73,000 applications to export CCL items to "Free World" countries
were approved in fiscal 1982.73
Even applications to export to "non-Free World" countries are
rarely denied. In 1982, 4,900 out of 6,700 applications to export CCL
items to communist countries were approved.74 The 1979 EAA gives
the Department of Defense a power to preempt OEA license decisions
on applications to export to communist countries.75 In practice, the
Defense Department informally reviews a large number of applica-
tions, but formally processes relatively few applications, 76 in part be-
65. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2404(c)(2) (Supp. III 1979).
66. Id. § 2404(d).
67. UPDATE, supra note 3, at 82.
68. TECHNOLOGY AND EAST-WEST TRADE, supra note 12, at 93.
69. Id. at 92.
70. UPDATE, supra note 3, at 37.
71. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2404(b). Communist countries are divided into five groups. Relatively lib-
eral controls apply to Romania (Group Q), Poland, Hungary (Group W) and the People's
Republic of China (Group P). Export to Kampuchea (formerly Cambodia), Cuba, North
Korea and Vietnam (Group Z) are essentially forbidden. A middle group (Group Y) con-
taining Albania, Bulgaria, Czecholslovakia, Estonia, German Democratic Republic (and
East Berlin), Laos, Latvia, Lithuania, Outer Mongolia and the U.S.S.R. is subject to controls
which restrict the quantity, end-use, and re-export of CCL goods. 15 C.F.R. § 370, Supp. 1
(1983); see Abbott, supra note 40, at 753.
72. Oversight on the Commerce Department, supra note 4, at 138 (Letter from Lionel Olmer,
Undersecretary for International Trade, Department of Commerce to Senator Jake Gan, R-
Utah, Mar. 10, 1983).
73. EXPORT ADMINISTRATION REPORT: 1982, supra note 58, at 6.
74. Id.
75. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2409(g) (Supp. III 1979); see Evrard, supra note 41, at 27.
76. UPDATE, supra note 3, at 38.
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cause formal review can take up to two years." In fact, in 1982 only
1,800 applications were referred to the Defense Department for formal
review.78
Foreign Policy Controls
While National Security controls apply only to goods specified by
the CCL, the EAA gives the President authority to restrict any export
"to the extent necessary to further significantly the foreign policy of the
United States. 7 9 No potential military use need be present.8 0
Foreign policy controls are designed to economically coerce other
nations to conform their conduct to American standards, and to express
American disapproval of other nations' conduct.8 ' The President, in
consultation with the State Department, determines which goods and
countries are to be subject to foreign policy controls.82
When the President imposes a foreign policy control, the Com-
merce Department implements the control using the same licensing
system used for national security controls. 83 Foreign policy controls
expire after one year if not renewed by the President.84
FOREIGN AVAILABILITY IN EXISTING CONTROL MECHANISMS
Foreign Availability Provisions in the EAA
The Export Administration Act of 1979 was the first significant at-
tempt to incorporate the assessment of foreign availability into the ex-
port license process.85 The general provisions of this Act state:
the President shall not impose controls for foreign policy or national
security purposes on the export from the United States of goods or
technology which he determines are available without restriction from
sources outside the United States in significant quantities and compa-
rable in quality to those produced in the United States .. .86
The general provisions, however, give the President power to prohibit
the export of goods or technology which are available from foreign
sources if he determines that the lack of the prohibition would be detri-
mental to either national security or foreign policy. 7 This caveat, and
77. Zonderman, supra note 33, at 132.
78. UPDATE, supra note 3, at 38.
79. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405(a)(1) (Supp. III 1979).
80. Id.
81. Abbott, supra note 40, at 798-99.
82. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405(a)(1) (Supp. III 1979).
83. Id.
84. Id. § 2 405(a)(2).
85. Comment, The Export Administration Act o(1979." An Examination of Foreign Availability of
Controlled Goods and Technologies, 2 N.W. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 179, 186 (1980). Several 1972
and 1977 amendments to the Export Administration Act of 1969 also directed the President
to consider foreign availability when imposing export controls, however these amendments
were ignored in practice. Id. at 183-84.




the absence of objective criteria for defining terms such as "without
restriction," "significant quantities," and "comparable quality" nullifies
the effect of this foreign availability provision." The President is given
virtually unlimited discretionary authority to restrict exports which are
available from foreign sources.
Foreign Availability and National Security Controls
The EAA directs the Secretary of Commerce to review the CCL
periodically to assess whether listed items are available from foreign
sources.89 The test for foreign availability is whether an item is avail-
able in sufficient quality or quantity to defeat the purpose of an export
control.9" If this particular level of availability is found, the Secretary
must remove the item from the CCL. Nevertheless, the President is
specifically authorized to retain items on the CCL notwithstanding
their foreign availability in order to protect national security; in doing
so, he must initiate negotiations with foreign source countries to elimi-
nate foreign availability.9' If the President exercises this veto power,
the Secretary of Commerce is required to publish the basis of the Presi-
dent's decision and its estimated economic impact.92
The EAA forbids the Secretary of Commerce from denying ap-
proval of a validated license for any controlled item which is available
"in fact" from a foreign source. 93 The exporter bears the burden of
proving foreign availability.94 The applicant must offer reliable evi-
dence "including scientific or physical examination, expert opinion
based upon adequate factual information, or intelligence informa-
tion."95 Uncorroborated representations by applicants are not consid-
ered reliable evidence. 96
Determining whether a foreign substitute for a controlled item is
available requires extensive intelligence gathering and complicated
analysis. The OEA appears to have been paralyzed by the complexities
of developing the capacity to make foreign availability analyses.
Though the 1979 Act authorized appropriations of $1.25 million to de-
velop an intelligence gathering and assessment program, no funds were
actually appropriated to the foreign availability program in fiscal 1980
or 1981. 9' In fiscal 1982, Congress granted the OEA $280,000 to hire
private consultants who would develop a foreign availability assess-
ment program.98 The OEA hired a foreign availability program man-
88. Comment, supra note 85, at 195.
89. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2404(c)(3) (Supp. 1II 1979).
90. Id. § 2404(0(1).
91. Id. § 2404(0(l)-(4).
92. Id. § 2404(f)(1).
93. Id. § 2404(0(2).
94. Id. § 2404(0(3).
95. Id.
96. Id. § 2404(0(3).
97. EXPORT ADMINISTRATION REPORT: 1982, supra note 58, at 16.
98. Id.
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ager in the spring of 1982.9 9 As of May 1983, however, only three
people staffed the foreign availability assessment office."°° An office of
three people could not adequately assess worldwide availability of
comparable strategic goods and technology.
To assist the Commerce Department in developing a foreign availa-
bility assessment capacity, drafters of the EAA also created Technical
Advisory Committees (TAC's) composed of government and business
representatives.'' If the Secretary of Commerce cannot determine
whether an item is available abroad due to technical matters, he may
appoint a TAC to determine whether foreign availability exists. Certi-
fication of foreign availability from a TAC requires the Secretary of
Commerce to investigate and verify this availability. If verified, the
Secretary must remove the item from the CCL, but only if the availa-
bility of the foreign substitute renders the export control ineffective.
Removal is subject to a Presidential national security veto.'0 2
To date, no certification of foreign availability from a TAC has re-
sulted in removing an item from the CCL, 0 3 nor have any licenses for
export of CCL items been granted specifically on the basis of foreign
availability."° Thus, foreign availability provisions of the 1979 EAA
have had no significant effect on the administration of national security
export controls.
Foreign Availability and Foreign Policy Controls
As discussed above, the EAA delegates broad discretionary power
to the President to regulate exports for foreign policy reasons. 05 Refer-
ences to foreign availability considerations do not limit this discretion
in theory or in practice. The EAA directs the President to consider "the
availability from other countries of the goods or technology proposed
for such controls."'" The Act does not specify how much weight
should be given to the consideration of foreign availability in foreign
policy regulation; nor does it refer to availability of "comparable"
goods; rather it refers to the availability of the specific goods being con-
sidered for export. The Secretary of State, as the President's agent, is
directed to review the list of controlled items and to consider whether
any listed items are available from foreign sources.'0 7 Finally, the
President is directed to "take all feasible steps to initiate and conclude
negotiations with foreign governments to eliminate foreign availability
of controlled items."'0 8 Since none of these directives are subject to
99. Id.
100. UPDATE, supra note 3, at 91.
101. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2404(h) (Supp. III 1979).
102. Id. § 2404(h)(6).
103. H.R. REP. No. 257, supra note 48, at 19.
104. UPDATE, supra note 3, at 38.
105. See supra text accompanying notes 79-81.
106. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405(b)(1) (Supp. III 1979).
107. Id. § 2405(k).
108. Id. § 2405(g).
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congressional or administrative oversight, the President is free to con-
sider, or to ignore, foreign availability when imposing foreign policy
controls.
The 1979 EAA was the first export control legislation to incorporate
any reference to foreign availability in connection with foreign policy
controls. 109 This historic failure to consider foreign availability of con-
trolled items has contributed to the overall failure of foreign policy ex-
port controls." 1° Foreign policy controls are principally designed to
coerce a target nation to conform its behavior to American stan-
dards. "' If the "costs created by the denial of American goods or tech-
nology outweigh the benefits" of the non-conforming behavior, the
target country will presumably terminate its objectionable behavior. 112
When the target country is able to obtain foreign substitutes for the
prohibited goods, foreign policy controls become merely a symbolic ex-
pression of disapproval." 3
If the success of foreign policy controls is to be measured by their
ability to change a target country's behavior, foreign availability of
controlled items cannot be ignored. By such a standard, President Rea-
gan's 1981 embargo of pipelaying equipment to the Soviet Union was a
complete failure. President Reagan imposed these controls to protest
Soviet repression in Poland.' " American manufacturers lost one-half
billion dollars in sales, while Japanese manufacturers won eighty-five
percent of the Soviet market for pipelaying equipment. 1 5 American
business also lost foreign credibility following the sanctions. For exam-
ple, the National Association of Manufacturers reports that after the
imposition of the pipeline embargo, foreign invitations to bid began to
specify non-U.S. equipment." 6 When the embargo was lifted in No-
vember of 1982, there had been virtually no change in the Soviet
Union's policies towards Poland.' President Reagan lifted the con-
trols because European suppliers had refused to impose similar sanc-
tions."' Since the Soviet Union had alternative suppliers of pipelaying
109. Abbott, supra note 40, at 802.
110. Most foreign policy economic sanctions appear to have only symbolic value and do not in
fact coerce the target country into conforming behavior. The Institute for International Eco-
nomics studied 78 foreign policy economic sanctions by various countries. The group found
that the sanctions were successful in achieving their purpose in about 40% of the cases. 129
CONG. REC. H7455 (daily ed. September 26, 1983) (statement of Rep. Toby Roth, R-Wis.).
111. Abbott, supra note 40, at 799.
112. Id. at 822-23.
113. Id.
114. Statement on U.S. Measures Taken Against the Soviet Union, 17 WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
Doc. 1429 (Dec. 29, 1981). President Carter also used the EAA to implement a partial grain
embargo against the Soviet Union in 1979. UPDATE, supra note 3, at 26.
115. 129 CONG. REC. H7797 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1983) (statement of Rep. Robert Michel, R-Il1.).
116. Letter from Alexander B. Trowbridge, president, National Association of Manufacturers to
Representative Peter Kostmayer, D-Pa., (July 29, 1983), reprinted in id. at H7722 (daily ed.
Sept. 29, 1983).
117. East-West Trade Relations and the Soviet Pipeline Sanctions, 18 WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
Doc. 1475 (Nov. 15, 1982).
118. Id. at 1476.
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equipment, the embargo had no coercive effect on her conduct in Po-
land and the purpose of the embargo failed.
Hardline proponents of foreign policy controls argue that the
United States should symbolically express outrage or disapproval
through trade sanctions, regardless of whether the sanctions modify the
behavior of the target country." 9 Even the symbolic impact of such
gestures has been reduced as America's share of world markets, partic-
ularly in high technology goods, continues to steadily decline. 20 Many
such gestures may go unnoticed abroad while exporters suffer economic
losses at home. Furthermore, the same Administration that symboli-
cally denounced Soviet repression in Poland is willing to give economic
aid to non-communist countries it considers strategically important,
even when those countries suffer under repressive governments. 2
Symbolic expressions of outrage lose much of their moral credibility in
this atmosphere.
Multilateral Export Controls Under the EAA
The EAA authorized continued United States participation in the
Coordinating Committee (CoCom).122 CoCom was organized in 1949
as an informal, voluntary association of free world countries that
agreed to restrict the export of strategic goods to communist coun-
tries.' 23 CoCom membership now consists of Japan and the NATO
countries, except Iceland. 2 4 Export officials from member countries
meet to compile classified lists of restricted items having some military
use.' 25 CoCom restrictions are enforced only to protect the national
security of member nations, and not for foreign policy reasons. 126
CoCom lists are updated every three to four years and issued to
each member government. 27 Each individual government is then re-
sponsible for enforcing the embargoes. Member countries may request
one-time exceptions for permission to export an embargoed item to a
proscribed country. 28 Exceptions are granted by unanimous consent
of CoCom members. CoCom's success in preventing the transfer of
119. Abbott, supra note 40, at 822-23.
120. 129 CONG. REC. H7451 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1983) (statement of Rep. Don Bonker, D-Wash.).
121. For example, the Reagan Administration has asked Congress to continue economic and mili-
tary aid to Sudan in order to help that country counter military threats from Libya and
Ethiopia. House Foreign Affairs Committee members have expressed concern about Su-
dan's repression of southern Sudanese people. Ayres, Administration Seeks Money andArms
to Bolster Sudan, N.Y. Times, March 29, 1984, § i, at 4, col. 3. Similarly, millions of dollars
of military aid has been given to El Salvador, a country with a history of government by
terror, and a human rights record which only began to improve after millions of American
dollars had already been spent. Taubman, Shultz Indicates Salvadoran Gains on Human
Rights, N.Y. Times, Feb. 1, 1984, § 1, at 1, col. 4.
122. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2404(h) (Supp. III 1979).
123. Berman & Garson, supra note 43, at 834.
124. TECHNOLOGY AND EAST-WEST TRADE, supra note 12, at 153.
125. Id. at 835.
126. Id. at 841.
127. EXPORT ADMINISTRATION REPORT: 1982, supra note 58, at 24.
128. Comment, supra note 85, at 190.
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technology to communist countries has been seriously undermined by
CoCom's informal structure. CoCom is not based on a formal treaty
and its policies do not have the force of international law. 129 Further-
more, there are no provisions for international sanctions against mem-
bers who do not comply with CoCom embargoes.13
0
CoCom's effectiveness has also been limited by a lack of consensus
among member nations.' 3 ' America's CoCom allies are generally
more economically dependent than it is on trade with the Soviet Union
and Warsaw Pact countries. 3 2 In 1981, United States exports to the
Soviet Union were valued at $2 billion; exports from NATO countries
to the Soviet Union during the same period were estimated to be worth
$15 billion.'3 3  As a result of this dependence, CoCom allies are less
willing than the United States to impose broad export restrictions.
34
The CCL is a more comprehensive list than the CoCom embargo list.
The United States presently controls thirty-three categories of goods
and technology for national security reasons which are not restricted by
CoCom. 35 Items on the CoCom list, available from CoCom countries,
can be multilaterally restricted. CoCom does nothing to relieve the
problem of foreign availability of items falling within the CCL's addi-
tional thirty-three categories.
The United States is the only CoCom country to restrict the re-ex-
port of goods subject to its own controls from CoCom countries. 136
The added cost in time and paper work for the necessary double licens-
ing often causes foreign purchasers to seek alternative goods to Ameri-
can-made items. 37 Yet, without double licensing, the United States
cannot insure that a CCL item, which may have been cleared for export
because it is destined for a CoCom purchaser, will not be diverted to an
adversary. 38
While the United States imposes controls on more goods and tech-
nologies than does CoCom, it also asks for more exceptions to CoCom
embargoes than any other member. 1 Requests for exceptions are
rarely denied. 140 The Congressional Office of Technology Assessment
129. TECHNOLOGY AND EAST-WEST TRADE, supra note 12, at 154.
130. Id. at 12.
131. Id. at 160.
132. The Extent of Technology Transfers, supra note 13, at 109 (statement of Sen. John Heinz, R-
Pa.).
133. Id.
134. TECHNOLOGY AND EAST-WEST TRADE, supra note 12, at 173.
135. Id. at 117 (statement of Sen. Heinz, R-Pa.).
136. Evrard, supra note 41, at 24.
137. Comment, supra note 85, at 192.
138. For example, in 1981 the Commerce Department denied Boeing's application to export its
767, containing a sophisticated laser gyroscope, to Soviet-aligned Ethiopia. Ethiopia then
purchased an Air-Bus from France. The Air-Bus contained the same American manufac-
tured laser gyroscope used in the Boeing 767. Zonderman, supra note 33, at 103.
139. Oversight on the Commerce Department, supra note 4, at 81 (statement of Lionel Olmer).
140. Comment, The Export Administration Act of 1979. Latest Statutory Resolution ofthe "Right to
E ort" Versus National Security and Foreign Policy Controls, 19 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
272 (1981).
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(OTA) reported that since 1973 the majority of U.S. requests were for
exceptions to sell computer equipment.' 4 ' The OTA claims that
CoCom controls more computer exports than any other type of export
and that America's status as preferred supplier of such equipment re-
sults in a high number of exceptions requested.142 The Commerce De-
partment, on the other hand, reports that exceptions are requested
because many items embargoed by CoCom are available from non-
CoCom countries. 43 This admission signals two significant problems
with CoCom: the embargo list is too broad, and the membership is too
narrow to effectively restrict the transfer of militarily useful Western
technology to communist countries.
The 1979 EAA directed the President to negotiate with member na-
tions to make CoCom a more effective control mechanism.44 Towards
this goal, in January, 1982, the United States participated in the first
high level CoCom meeting since 1950.'1 The agenda and results of the
meeting remain classified; however, State Department officials repre-
senting the United States at the meeting were encouraged by a consen-
sus favoring more vigorous enforcement of CoCom restrictions."
Member nations accepted U.S. proposals to update the CoCom list to
include modern laser and computer technologies. 147 The updated
CoCom list is scheduled to be completed by July, 1984.148 Persistent
differences among organization members, however, are likely to delay
plans to restructure and strengthen CoCom. 14 9 Actual improvements
in the CoCom system are likely to take several years. Worldwide tech-
nological advances have made it impossible for the United States to
unilaterally control technology transfers to communist countries. A
multi-lateral control system is required if U.S. export controls are to be
effective.
CONSIDERATIONS OF FOREIGN AVAILABILITY IN FUTURE
CONTROL MECHANISMS
Proposals to Improve Foreign Availability Assessment Capacity
The Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs
reported dissatisfaction with the OEA's "almost total lack of progress"
in establishing procedures to evaluate foreign availability of controlled
items.'5 ° In response to the Commerce Department's complaint that
141. TECHNOLOGY AND EAST-WEST TRADE, supra note 12, at 159.
142. Id.
143. Oversight on the Commerce Department, supra note 4, at 81 (statement of Lionel Olmer).
144. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405(i) (Supp. III 1979).
145. The Extent of Technology Transfer, supra note 13, at 45 (statement of Fred C. Ikle).
146. Transfer of United States High Technology, supra note 14, at 158 (statement of James L.
Buckley, Undersecretary for Security Assistance, Science and Technology, Department of
State).
147. UPDATE, supra note 3, at 46.
148. U.S Trade Bars Anger Europeans, N.Y. Times, Jan. 23, 1984, at D1, col. 3, at D8, col. 4.
149. UPDATE, supra note 3, at 46.
150. S. REP. No. 170, supra note 6, at 22.
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funds were not available to develop a foreign availability assessment
program, 51 the Senate Committee noted that since 1979 Congress has
granted the OEA its full requests for funds.5 2 Though critical of the
Commerce Department's lack of progress, Senate bill 979 offers mini-
mal directions for improving the foreign availability program. The bill
instructs the Departments of Commerce and Defense to cooperate in
gathering and assessing information on foreign availability, and fur-
thermore directs the departments to establish a joint computer system
for foreign availability data.' 53 It would also require the Commerce
and Defense Departments to provide Congress with a joint quarterly
report describing their ability to assess foreign availability.'54
The 1979 EAA implicitly mandates cooperation between the Com-
merce and Defense Departments,'55 but cooperation has been histori-
cally handicapped by the divergent goals of the two departments. The
Commerce Department is simultaneously responsible for promoting
trade and restricting exports.' 56 The Defense Department, on the other
hand, is primarily responsible for protecting national security and
tends to favor trade restriction. 7 Commerce and Defense have long
disagreed over the proper scope of export controls, 158 and it is therefore
unlikely that these basic differences can be resolved by legislative
order.
House bill 3231 goes farther than requiring general cooperation and
would create an Office of Foreign Availability within the Commerce
Department. 59 The bill would require the Office of Foreign Availabil-
ity to report its activities to Congress every six months.'6 The present
law directs the Secretary of Commerce to consult "appropriate" gov-
ernment agencies and TAC's in order to assess foreign availability. 16
A sophisticated assessment of foreign availability requires integration
of information from the American intelligence agencies, the Defense
Department, domestic and foreign manufacturers, the scientific com-
munity, and economists. 162 This complicated process could be carried
out most efficiently in a centralized office within the OEA.
151. Oversight on the Commerce Department, supra note 4, at 80 (statement of Lionel Olmer).
152. S. REP. No. 170, supra note 6, at 22.
153. Id. at 39.
154. Id. at 79.
155. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2404(f)(6) (Supp. III 1979).
156. Oversight on the Commerce Department, supra note 4, at 18 (statement of Senator William
Cohen, R-Me.).
157. 129 CONG. REc. H7452 (daily ed. Sept. 6, 1983) (statement of Rep. Frank Annunzio, D-Il1.).
158. UPDATE, supra note 3, at 92.
159. H.R. 3231, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 108(d)(1), 129 CONG. REC. H8766 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1983).
160. Id.
161. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2404(0(1) (Supp. IIl 1979).
162. Abbott, supra note 40, at 805-06.
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National Security Controls Amendments
Senate Bill 979
Senate bill 979 alters the definition of foreign availability within the
EAA. Under the present Act, "foreign availability" renders national
security controls ineffective when goods or technology are available "in
sufficient quantity and sufficient quality" from sources outside the
United States.'63 In an effort to strengthen export restrictions, S. 979
adopts provisions from the Reagan Administration's bill that would
make it more difficult to find foreign availability of controlled goods.
The bill would replace "sufficient quality" with "comparable qual-
ity." '164 This choice of words is intended to imply fungibility. 65 Under
the Administration's bill, the mere capacity of a foreign country to pro-
duce comparable goods does not constitute foreign availability unless
the proscribed country can interchange the substitute at no additional
costs. 1
6 6
This change fails to establish a useful definition of "foreign availa-
bility." Proponents of unrestricted trade argue that availability exists
when the proscribed country "can satisfy its need with a foreign substi-
tute at an acceptable price."' 167 Those who favor tighter controls argue
that the Soviet Union and its allies prefer the quality of American
products, and that because foreign substitutes do not fill Soviet demand
for strategic goods and technology, they therefore do not represent ac-
tual "foreign availability."'
' 61
Foreign availability cannot be effectively assessed until it is accu-
rately defined. Under the definition provided in S. 979, foreign availa-
bility only exists where comparable substitutes would "render the
controls ineffective in achieving their purpose,"1 69 whether that pur-
pose is motivated by foreign policy or national security. This qualifica-
tion negates the objective criteria for determining foreign availability
offered by subsequent portions of the Senate bill.' 7° The executive
branch has considerable discretionary authority to determine when ex-
ports of goods and technology are to be controlled for both national
security and foreign policy reasons.' The President, in consultation
163. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2403(0(1) (Supp. III 1979).
164. EXPORT ADMINISTRATION AUTHORIZATION, supra note 7, at 9.
165. Id. at 30.
166. Id.
167. Abbott, supra note 40, at 805.
168. Oversight on the Commerce Department, supra note 4, at 173 (Letter from Theodore Thau,
retired Executive Secretary of the Export Administration Review Board, to Senator Jake
Gan, R-Utah, Feb. 28, 1983).
169. S. REP. No. 170, supra note 6, at 39.
170. Senate Bill 979 suggests that the Secretary of Commerce consider "cost, reliability, the avail-
ability and reliability of spare parts and the cost and quality thereof, maintenance programs,
technical data packages, back up packages, durability, quality of end products produced by
the item proposed for export, and scale of production" when determining foreign availabil-
ity. S. REP. No. 170, supra note 6, at 45.
171. Comment, The Regulation of Technical Data Under TheArms Export ControlAct of 1976 and
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with the Commerce, Defense, and State Departments, thus has the au-
thority to decide when those purposes have been achieved. In effect,
this "definition" merely reinforces other provisions in the existing EAA
which allow the President to impose controls "notwithstanding" for-
eign availability.'72 Export controls imposed for national security rea-
sons "notwithstanding foreign availability" do not deprive targeted
countries of the controlled goods or technology.
The Senate Banking Committee intended to limit the imposition of
controls "notwithstanding" foreign availability, and to make an objec-
tive foreign availability analysis an essential part of the licensing pro-
cess. 7 3 The Committee noted that "in most situations the exporters
themselves are in the best position to be aware of the foreign availabil-
ity of controlled items, since they are knowledgeable about their com-
petitors and the nature of the products they offer."' Senate bill 979
injects this knowledge in two provisions. First, the Commerce Depart-
ment is instructed to give notice of its annual review of the CCL and
invite public comment in the Federal Register before the review be-
gins. 175 The present law requires only that notice be given at some time
during each annual review. 176 Second, and more importantly, the bill
gives increased weight to evidence presented by exporters seeking to
remove an item from the CCL or obtain a validated license on the basis
of foreign availability. Once "reliable" evidence is put forth by the
exporter, S. 979 would require the OEA to grant a validated license or
remove the controls, unless the OEA finds "reliable" evidence that for-
eign substitutes do not exist. 17' Exporters' representations would be
given equal weight with Technical Advisory Committees' representa-
tions. 78 The present Act does not require the OEA to provide evidence
in support of its denials of its foreign availability. 179 Shifting this bur-
dern of proof to the OEA should increase cooperation between the
OEA and exporters, who frequently view OEA decisions as capricious
and anti-business.' 80 Under S. 979, the OEA can only defeat an appli-
cant's representations of foreign availability with "scientific or physical
examination, expert opinion based upon adequate factual information,
or intelligence information."'' This burden will force the OEA to go
forward in developing a foreign availability assessment capacity.
Senate bill 979 would make three additional significant changes in
the Export Administration Act of 1979. A Matter of Executive Discretion, 6 B.C. INT'L &
COMP. L. REV. 169, 196 (1983).
172. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2403(e) (Supp. III 1979).
173. S. REP. No. 170, supra note 6, at 10.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 42.
176. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2403(c)(3) (Supp. III 1979).
177. S. REP. No. 170, supra note 6, at 45.
178. Id. at 46.
179. 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2404(0(1)-(f(2) (Supp. III 1979).
180. The Extent of Technology Transfers, supra note 13, at 69.
181. S. REP. No. 170, supra note 6, at 45.
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foreign availability analysis under the EAA. The bill would require
the Secretary of Defense to consider foreign availability when drafting
the MCTL; 182 allow TAC's to initiate steps to remove a CCL by reason
of foreign availability;" 3 and provide an illustrative list of factors for




The House bill makes no attempt to clarify or define foreign availa-
bility. The report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs stresses the neg-
ative economic impact to American exporters when markets are lost to
foreign competitors who produce substitutes for items controlled by
American export laws.185 The bill offers procedural amendments to en-
sure that controls are not retained on any goods available from foreign
sources.
The present Act requires that when goods are controlled, notwith-
standing foreign availability, the President is to "initiate" negotiations
with foreign producers of substitute goods or technology in an effort to
form multilateral export restrictions.' 86 The House bill would allow
controls to remain in effect for a six month negotiation period. If the
negotiations do not totally eliminate foreign availability within that six
months, the goods or technology must be removed from the CCL.
87
The President could only extend the six month negotiation period upon
certification to Congress that lifting the control would be detrimental to
national security.' 88 The bill would also require that when a TAC cer-
tifies that a controlled item has become available from foreign sources,
that item must be removed from the CCL unless foreign availability is
eliminated within six months.18
9
Due to the complexities and delicate nature of international agree-
ments it seems unlikely that foreign availability of most controlled
items could be eliminated in six months. Negotiations within CoCom
to add or delete embargoed items can take up to two years.' 90 The Pres-
ident faces two primary obstacles to successful negotiations with coun-
tries producing the particular goods. First, America's allies do not
share the high level of concern over technology transfer to Eastern Eu-
rope, the Soviet Union, and the People's Republic of China.' 9 ' Second,
182. Id. at 42. Senate bill 979 emphasizes the present EAA's directive to integrate the MCTL
with the CCL, ultimately stressing a focus on controlling technology, rather than controlling
the products of that technology.
183. Id. at 46.
184. Id. at 45.
185. H.R. REP. No. 257, supra note 6, at 19.
186. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2404(f)(4) (Supp. III 1979).
187. H.R. 3231, supra note 159, § 108(b).
188. Id.
189. H.R. REP. No. 257, supra note 6, at 19.
190. 129 CONG. REC. H7455 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1983) (statement of Sen. Toby Roth, R-Wis.).
191. TECHNOLOGY AND EAST-WEST TRADE, supra note 9, at 173.
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given the OEA's present inability to assess foreign availability and the
Soviet Union's extensive intelligence regarding Western technological
developments, information about available foreign substitutes may
reach Soviet-bloc sources before it reaches the OEA. Thus, it is likely
that the United States would be seeking negotiations with foreign sup-
pliers already trading with countries which it seeks to embargo.
The Committee on Foreign Affairs found that foreign suppliers of
controlled goods render national security export controls pointless. 192
The House report presumes that controlling goods and technology for
which there are comparable foreign substitutes will do nothing to fur-
ther national security goals.1 93 This presumption, however, ignores the
fact that adversaries, in particular, the Soviet Union, seek American
military technology for two reasons: to copy innovative designs and to
assess American military capabilities in order to develop effective
countermeasures. 1
94
According to the House report, losses in export profits and Ameri-
can jobs damage national security by hindering technological research
and development. 95 As America's lead time in high technology de-
creases, further research and development becomes even more impor-
tant to maintaining the qualitative edge on which it depends for
national defense. For example, in the mid- 1960's, American computers
and microelectronics had advanced a decade ahead of those of any for-
eign competitors. 96 By 1983, that lead time had been reduced to three
to five years. 197 In February, 1984, American researchers reported that
the Japanese are now producing supercomputers which are more ad-
vanced than American computers. 98 Supercomputers are used to de-
sign nuclear weapons and are therefore important to national security.
A loss of our qualitative edge in the computer field has therefore
threatened national security.
Trade restrictionists argue that even where export controls directly
result in lost sales, the economic consequences are trivial. t9 9 In 1982,
exports to Soviet Bloc countries represented only 1.7% of total U.S. ex-
ports.2°  The Commerce Department estimates that of the $2.8 billion
worth of goods exported to the Soviet Union in 1983, $1.9 billion worth
192. H.R. REP. No. 257, supra note 6, at 4.
193. Id. at 19.
194. SOVIET ACQUISITION, supra note 12, at 10; Transfers of United States High Technology, supra
note 14, at 573 (statement of Charles Lecht, former president, Advanced Computer Tech-
niques, a private exporter).
195. H.R. REP. No. 257, supra note 6, at 19.
196. 129 CONG. REC. H7459 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1983) (statement of Rep. James Courter, R-N.J.).
197. Id.
198. Big Japanes Gain in Computers Seen, supra note 37, at I, col. 1.
199. UPDATE, supra note 3, at 54.
200. Id. at 5 1; American business' small share of the Soviet high tech market is a result of overall
restrictive American East-West trade policies. The United States has denied "most-favored-
nation" status to most communist countries, and has restricted the amount of subsidized
official export credits available to the communist world. As a result, American exporters
have not shared in the significant increases in the volume of East-West trade which occurred
in the 1970's. See TECHNOLOGY AND EAST-WEST TRADE, supra note 12, at 39-40.
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were agricultural products.2° ' Sales of high tech goods represent only
about ten percent of American trade with the Soviet Bloc. 2 2 Further-
more, the vast majority of applications to sell goods subject to national
security controls are approved. In 1982, only 658 applications to export
to communist countries, representing $90 million in lost sales, were de-
nied for national security reasons.20 3
The loss of $90 million in export sales must be balanced against
long-term increases in defense costs.2°  The Defense Department esti-
mates that it will spend $1.6 trillion on national defense during the next
five years. 20 ' The Defense Department also estimates that these ex-
penditures could have been tens of billions of dollars less had Ameri-
can military technology and "know how" not been transferred to the
Soviet Union during the 1970's.216 Reduction of American high tech-
nology export sales would not have eliminated this transfer, but may
have helped reduce it.
In other foreign availability-related amendments to the national se-
curity controls, H.R. 3231 would require the Secretary of Defense to
issue regulations governing foreign availability determinations;20 7 au-
thorize the General Accounting Office to determine whether foreign
availability was used in drafting the CCL;20 and require the Depart-
ment of Defense to consider foreign availability in drafting the
MCTL. ° 9
Foreign Policy Controls Amendments
Senate bill 979 and H.R. 3231 propose identical changes to the for-
eign availability provisions relating to foreign policy controls. Both
bills suggest that the President consider foreign availability before im-
posing foreign policy controls.210  Nevertheless, foreign availability
would not become a criterion in the licensing process until six months
after a foreign policy control was put into effect. The bills would re-
quire that the President evaluate the foreign availability of controlled
items in a report to Congress at the end of the initial six month period
and prior to extending any control for another six month term.2 1 1 If an
extension is sought, the Secretary of Commerce is to "take into ac-
count" the foreign availability of controlled goods.2 12 If the Secretary
201. Id. at 52.
202. The Extent of Technology Transfers, supra note 13, at 13 (statement of Sen. William Arm-
strong, R-Colo.).
203. EXPORT ADMINISTRATION REPORT: 1982, supra note 58, at 25.
204. The Extent of Technology Transfers, supra note 13, at 18 (statement of Fred C. Ikle).
205. Id. at 9 (statement of Sen. William Armstrong, R-Colo.).
206. Id. at 48 (statement of Fred C. Ikle).
207. H.R. 3231, supra note 159, § 108(e).
208. Id. § 109.
209. Id.
210. S. REP. No. 170, supra note 6, at 52; H.R. 3231, supra note 159, § 110(a).
211. S. REP. No. 170, supra note 6, at 55; H.R. 3231, supra note 159, § 110(c).
212. S. REP. No. 170, supra note 6, at 55; H.R. 3231, supra note 159, § 112(b)(2).
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"affirmatively determines" that the availability of foreign substitutes
for controlled goods renders the controls "ineffective in achieving the
purpose of the control," the license may issue, and where appropriate,
the item may be removed from the control list.213
Both the House and Senate bills limit the OEA's discretionary
power to impose national security controls when foreign substitutes are
available; the OEA's discretionary power to impose foreign policy con-
trols, on the other hand, would remain considerably more broad.
Under both bills, only the President could override the automatic re-
moval of national security controls once foreign availability is found.2 14
By contrast, when an item controlled for foreign policy reasons is found
to be available from foreign sources, those controls may not be lifted
until the Secretary of Commerce "affirmatively determines" that for-
eign availability has thwarted the purpose of the control.215
Initially, it seems ironic that Congress would restrict national secur-
ity controls more than foreign policy controls. American exporters,
CoCom allies, and most export control critics support national security
controls when used to prevent the transfer of militarily useful technol-
ogy to adversaries.216 At the same time, the general consensus emerging
is that foreign policy controls do not work. 217 The foreign policy con-
trols amendments reflect congressional deference to Presidential au-
thority to determine foreign policy.218 Imposing fewer limitations on
foreign policy controls also reflects congressional approval of their use
as symbolic expressions of moral outrage.
Amendments to Multi-Lateral Export Controls
The United States can only insure that foreign exporters of high
risk technological goods will not sell to Soviet-aligned countries
through international export control agreements. Both the Senate and
the House have proposed strengthening the Coordinating Committee.
In identical provisions, both bills direct the President to:
improve the International Control List and minimize the approval of
exceptions to that list, strengthen enforcement and cooperation in en-
forcement efforts, provide sufficient funding for the Committee, and
improve the structure and function of the Secretariat of the Committee
by upgrading professional staff, translation services, data base mainte-
nance, communications, and facilities. 219
Both bills speak in broad terms of revising CoCom's embargo lists to
insure the national security of all members. Senate bill 979 would pro-
213. Id.
214. S. REP. No. 170, supra note 6, at 44; H.R. 3231, supra note 159, § 108(b).
215. S. REP. No. 170, supra note 6, at 55; H.R. 3231, supra note 159, § I 12(b)(2).
216. 129 CONG. REC. H7797 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1983); Abbott, supra note 40, at 808.
217. 129 CONG. REC. H7451 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1983) (statement of Rep. Frank Annunzio, D-Ill.).
218. See U.S. v. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
219. S. REP. No. 170, supra note 6, at 48. H.R. 3231, supra note 157, § 107.
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vide strength through sanctions, while H.R. 3231 promotes strength
through cooperation.
Senate bill 979 instructs the President to raise the CoCom agree-
ment to international treaty status, thereby giving it legitimacy in inter-
national law.22° The bill also provides that the President may deny
trading privileges, including the freedom to export goods into the
United States, to any foreign exporter who violates American national
security controls.22' This sanction would apply to both foreign export-
ers who re-export CCL items without OEA approval, and those who
violate CoCom embargoes.
The Senate Banking Committee justifies these increased sanctions
on the grounds that the United States should not be obliged to keep its
markets open to those who violate its national security. The Commit-
tee notes that the United States has the sovereign right to control im-
ports into the U.S. and that these sanctions do not involve extra-
territorial application of American law.222
These sanctions are not likely to be well received by America's
CoCom allies. CoCom restrictions apply only to strategic goods con-
trolled for national security reasons.223 Although CoCom members are
generally inclined to support unilateral national security controls, the
failed 1982 Soviet pipeline equipment embargo has left most members
wary of American efforts to enforce any export policies multilater-
ally.224 Commerce Department regulations proposed in January, 1984
which would impose additional re-export restrictions on foreign pur-
chasers of CCL items met strong European objections. 225 The addi-
tional threat of import sanctions could inhibit cooperation among an
already divided CoCom group.
In contrast, H.R. 3231 does not contain import sanctions. The For-
eign Affairs Committee emphasized the need to recognize the sover-
eignty of CoCom partners with respect to goods and firms within their
territory. 226 The bill requires the President to "consult" with "appro-
priate" allies in an effort to obtain their cooperation before imposing
foreign policy controls.227 This vague directive will not insure interna-
tional cooperation on foreign policy controls. Nevertheless, it does of-
fer, at least in form, the type of international dialogue concerning
foreign policy controls which is presently available through CoCom for
national security controls.
Both proposals would eliminate the double licensing procedure re-
220. S. REP. No. 170, supra note 6, at 48.
221. Id. at 73.
222. Id. at 19.
223. TECHNOLOGY AND EAST-WEST TRADE, supra note 12, at 155.
224. Note, ExtraterritorialApplication ofthe Export Administration Act of1979 Under International
andAmerican Law, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1308, 1310 (1983).
225. U.S Trade Bars Anger Europeans, supra note 148, at D8.
226. H.R. REP. No. 257, supra note 6, at 7.
227. H.R. 3231, supra note 159, § I10(b)(2).
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quired for goods to be exported to CoCom countries.228 Presently, con-
trolled goods shipped to CoCom countries are cleared once by the
OEA, and a second time by CoCom if re-exported.229 About one-third
of all license applications are for exports of CCL items to CoCom
countries. 230 The House bill would waive license requirements for any
goods shipped to CoCom countries, subject to exceptions made by the
Secretary of Commerce. 23 ' The Senate bill would still require licenses
for goods controlled unilaterally and for MCTL items. 23 2 Neither bill
requires the elimination of unilateral controls; however, the House bill
effectively eliminates unilateral controls since any CoCom member
could import unilaterally controlled goods without being subject to re-
exporting requirements. CoCom members would be free to observe
United States export controls, but only required to observe CoCom
controls.
Senate bill 979 and H.R. 3231 both recognize the need to expand
multi-lateral controls outside the CoCom group. Both bills specifically
direct the Secretary of State to negotiate with non-CoCom countries to
establish multi-lateral national security export controls.233 The Senate
bill insures that these agreements will be effective, by directing the Sec-
retary of Commerce to enforce non-CoCom cooperative export agree-
ments in the same manner as CoCom agreements. 234 Both would be
elevated to treaty status, and exports of designated items to cooperating
countries would not require OEA licensing. Ultimately, it is through
such a system of treaty agreements that the United States can eliminate
the foreign availability of goods and technology it seeks to restrict.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
America does not have a monopoly on high technology, nor can it
persuade all foreign suppliers of high technology to abide by its percep-
tions of beneficial national security controls. Likewise, the United
States cannot prevent Soviet Bloc countries from developing their own
military technology.235 Nevertheless, a perilous and clearly hostile So-
viet military buildup confronts the United States and her allies. 236 It
would be foolish to sell to adversaries directly or indirectly products
with a potential military use which they lack the capacity to produce
themselves. 237 It would be equally unwise to sell technology to an ad-
versary simply because it could have been purchased elsewhere. To the
228. S. REP. No. 170, supra note 6, at 44. H.R. 3231, supra note 159, § 106(b).
229. Evrard, supra note 41, at 24.
230. H.R. REP. No. 257, supra note 6, at 6.
231. H.R. 3231, supra note 159, § 106(b).
232. S. REP. No. 170, supra note 6, at 44.
233. S. REP. No. 170, supra note 6, at 49. H.R. 3231, supra note 159, § 106(0(1).
234. S. REP. No. 170, supra note 6, at 49.
235. Mavroules, Denying Moscow High-Tech, N.Y. Times, Oct. 10, 1983, § 1, at 19, col. 3.
236. Transfers of United States High Technology, supra note 14, at 247 (statement of Admiral
Bobby R. Inman).
237. Mavroules, supra note 235.
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extent that technology acquisition is made difficult and costly to adver-
saries, the United States gains valuable lead time to develop defense
technology.238
The present EAA noticeably lacks a definition of foreign availabil-
ity. Foreign availability should be a primary consideration in the im-
position of national security controls. It is a complex idea which
requires a precise definition. A precise definition of foreign availability
should include a sophisticated analysis not only of quantity and quality
of the substitute; it should also consider the amenability of the supplier
to export controls, any costs of substitution the proscribed country
would incur, and the value of the item for defense intelligence pur-
poses. This analysis should be done by an objective group having
members from the Departments of Commerce, State, and Defense, rep-
resentatives from the intelligence community and significant input
from private industry. If a controlled good would potentially leak sen-
sitive information about technological ability, that good should be con-
sidered unique and therefore subject to strict controls. House bill
3231's proposal to establish an Office of Foreign Availability will en-
able the OEA to undertake such a sophisticated analysis.
The most effective national security controls would incorporate pro-
visions from both the Senate and House bills. Items with a significant
military end use should be controlled for national security reasons both
as a means of depriving American adversaries of useful technology and
of making acquisition of technology more difficult and costly. Vigor-
ous negotiations to obtain multilateral cooperation in export controls
would be the most effective way to insure such technological depriva-
tion. These negotiations should not be pressured by a congressional
time limit. The Executive should remain free to impose restrictions
notwithstanding foreign availability. Granting TAC's power to initiate
applications to remove items from the CCL based on foreign availabil-
ity and requiring the OEA to produce reliable evidence when negating
an exporter's representation of foreign availability will insure that con-
trols imposed in spite of foreign availability are truly necessary to na-
tional security.
Foreign availability considerations should be removed from the for-
eign policy control provisions of the EAA. Symbolic statements
through export controls can be part of a consistent foreign policy, but it
is unlikely that such economic statements of position will attain wide-
spread international support.
International support for multilateral national security controls
should be actively pursued. CoCom should be not only strengthened
but its membership should be expanded. Increased dialogue between
both CoCom and non-CoCom allies, with recognition of the need to
238. The Extent of Technology Transfer, supra note 13, at 68 (statement of Lawrence J. Brady,
Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Trade Administration).
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compromise, can both eliminate foreign availability problems and im-
prove America's business credibility abroad. Using multilateral con-
trols in conjunction with limited unilateral controls, the United States
can restrict the flow of sensitive goods and technology without punish-
ing American exporters.
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